Introduction
The issue of how to allocate greenhouse gas emission permits to nations has recently received a lot of attention. The¯rst international agreement on the limitation of the emissions of such gases { the Kyoto Protocol| implicitly de¯nes allocations of tradable permits to countries for a¯rst commitment period (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . Moreover, discussions on the allocations of permits for subsequent commitment periods are taking place.
Most of these discussions are actually driven by equity principles (such as allocating the same amount of permits per capita in all countries) and several authors have analyzed the welfare e®ects of these and other so-called`equitable' allocation rules (see, among others, Reiner and Jacoby (1997), Rose, Stevens, Edmonds and Wise (1998) and Blanchard, Criqui, Trommetter and Viguier (2001) ).
Although allocation rules based on equity principles seem very appealing, they may not necessarily be accepted by every nation or every group of nations. Indeed, such allocations might lead some of them to bear costs that largely exceed the bene¯ts of the emissions limitation. In that case, no global international agreement can be reached since such agreements are signed on a voluntary basis. This issue of voluntary participation to international agreements, and the related problem of stability of these agreements, have been investigated by numerous authors using various approaches based on game theory concepts (for a survey of the early contributions on the issue, see Folmer, Hanley and Missfeldt (1998) ).
In this paper, we link the literature on equity in the allocation of emission permits to the one on voluntary participation to a global agreement. Hence, this work is related to the analysis by Germain and van Steenberghe (2003) who look at a weak form of participation constraint, namely individual rationality. Here, we extend their analysis to a more subtle concept of stability of the global agreement: coalitional rationality.
Our purpose is not to analyze the process of coalition formation. Using cooperative game theory, we rather consider the grand coalition (the global agreement) and analyze its stability. The notion of stability used is based on the concept of°-core developed for cooperative games with externalities by Tulkens (1995, 1997) . 1 We present a method which allows to compute allocations of permits satisfying°-core participation constraints while being as close as possible to an equitable allocation rule. Then, using a world simulation model, we evaluate the welfare e®ects of various allocation rules as well as the amount of permits allocated under these rules. Some of the rules analyzed are directly based on equity principles while others are based on game theoretic solution concepts (nucleolus and Shapley value).
Moreover, we employ a dynamic decision framework that ensures stability of the global agreement not only at the¯rst decision period, but along the entire time path. 2 We use the dynamic {closed loop|approach introduced by Germain, Toint, Tulkens and De Zeeuw (2003) (GTTZ (2003) hereafter). The motivation for using such a dynamic framework is twofold. First, it is much more realistic than considering that an international agreement is signed once for all periods during decades. Indeed, negotiations are typically based on commitment periods and the obligations negotiated for each period are likely to be called into question from time to time. Second, a static decision setting would not allow one to compute such allocations of permits because, in that case, there would be a single (intertemporal) participation constraint instead of one constraint for each commitment period. In fact, an in¯nity of allocations satisfying participation constraints could then be de¯ned at each period. The dynamic setting allows us to de¯ne an allocation of permits at each period.
1 The°-core is de¯ned below in section 3. It di®ers from the concept of \stable coalitions" used by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barret (1994) , derived from the literature on the stability of cartels.
A comparison of these approaches is made in Tulkens (1998) . For a discussion about the di®erences in cooperative and non-cooperative game theory approaches, see Bloch (1997) and Finus (2003) .
2 Stevens and Rose (2002) also present a dynamic analysis of tradable emission permits. In their paper, dynamics refer mainly to intertemporal trades of permits, not to the decision framework.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, the dynamic decision model is presented and the international optimum is characterized. The global agreement with tradable permits is described in Section 3. Then various so-called`equitable' rules to allocate permits are presented in Section 4. The method whereby these equitable allocations are constrained in order to ensure stability of the global agreement is also described and analyzed in the same section. Simulations results are presented in Section 5 where we analyze the welfare implications of the aforementioned`equitable' allocation rules. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the results and concludes.
The model and international optimality
Consider a set N of countries indexed by i 2 N = f1; 2; :::; ng and a set £ of commitment periods indexed by t 2 £ = f1; 2; :::; Tg. 3 At each period t, country i's emissions of greenhouse gases are a proportion º it of its output Y it , which is considered as exogenous. However, this emissions-output ratio is a®ected by a domestic abatement policy represented by the choice of a positive value for the rate ¹ it (0 · ¹ it · 1). Emissions of country i at period t are therefore given by:
The accumulation of these pollutants emitted by all countries leads to a change in the concentration of greenhouse gases. The level of concentration, M t+1 at time t + 1, is expressed with respect to its preindustrial level, M 0 :
where ± (0 < ± < 1) is the rate of decay of the gases in the atmosphere and¯(0 < < 1) is the marginal atmospheric retention ratio. The change in the concentration of 3 We use here the economic-climatic model presented in GTTZ (2003) and Germain and van Steenberghe (2003) . Our description of a global agreement (see section 3 below) is, however, di®erent than theirs.
gases a®ects the radiative forcing which¯nally in°uences the atmospheric temperature.
These e®ects are modelled by a simple equation:
where ¢T t is the temperature change w.r.t. its preindustrial level and´(´> 0) is an exogenous parameter.
A positive temperature change {and the resulting sea level rise and precipitation changes{ cause di®erent kinds of damages on health, agriculture, forests, water supply, biodiversity, etc. The costs of these damages for country i at time t are expressed by:
where b i1 and b i2 are positive parameters with b i2 > 1 8i. Hence, through equations (2) and (3), damage costs of country i (D it ) are a strictly increasing function of its own emissions (E it ) as well as of the emissions of all the other countries (E jt , 8j 6 = i).
Controlling emissions, that is, abating, is also costly. The cost for country i of limiting its emissions up to the amount E it at time t is taken to be a strictly decreasing function of its emissions E it :
where a i1 and a i2 (i 2 N) are positive parameters with a i2 > 1 8i and, by (1),
In the sequential dynamic decision framework that we use below, an international optimum is de¯ned at each period t. It is the solution of the minimization of an unweighted sum of the abatement and damage costs borne by all countries from that period t until the last one, T . Thus, at each period of time t, an optimal policy is given by the solution of: min fEi;ug i2N;u2ft;:::;T g
subject to (1)-(5),
and
where ® (0 < ® · 1) is the discount factor.
Denoting by E ¤ it , ¹ ¤ it and M ¤ t respectively the optimal level of emissions of country i, the optimal abatement rate of the same country and the optimal stock of gases at period t, the international optimum satis¯es the following standard conditions:
that is, the marginal abatement cost of every country is equal, at every point in time t, to the discounted sum, over all countries, of the marginal damage costs occurring from then on in the future.
3 Core-stable global agreements with tradable permits
In this section, we introduce tradable permits in the model just stated. We¯rst show that, at any period t, the competitive equilibrium of the permits market induced by an appropriate initial allocation of permits is an international optimum. Then, we compute the costs borne by the countries at such permits market equilibrium. These costs allow us to de¯ne the coalitional rationality of any agreement that involves a competitive market equilibrium induced by some initial allocation of permits. The analysis is¯rst performed for the last period, T, and its results are then used for computing costs and de¯ning coalitional rationality at preceding periods. Finally, we present the cooperative game associated with the dynamic economic model. ment. Formally, the market equilibrium induced by the allocation e E T satisfying (10) guarantees coalitional rationality only if
where S is any non-empty subset (called a coalition) of N , the set of countries, and V S;T is the total cost for the members of S of the actions taken by them when S forms.
The outcome of these actions {a vector of emissions E T = fE 1T ; :::; E nT g such that (i) the members of the coalition minimize the sum of their total costs, given what the other countries do and (ii) the non members of the coalition minimize their own total costs given what the coalition does and given what the other non members do{ is called a Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium (PANE) with respect to S and de¯ned in Chander and Tulkens (1995, p. 284) .
4 To simplify notation, and only when no confusion arises, we shall henceforth drop the argument in E In the context of the present dynamic model, the outcome V S;T of a PANE w.r.t.
some S at time T reads as follows. Given an inherited stock M T , the equilibrium vector of emissions E T is such that:
(i) the level of emissions of the countries which are members of S, E iT ; 8i 2 S, is the solution of:
subject to (1)- (5), E iT · º iT Y iT , E iT > 0 and where E jT (j = 2 S) is given by (14), while (ii) the level of emissions of each country which is not a member of S, E jT ; j = 2 S, is the solution of:
subject to (1)- (5), E jT · º jT Y jT , E jT > 0, and where E iT (i 6 = j) is given by (13).
The value of (13) at the solution so-described de¯nes V S;T , a magnitude that will play a central role in the cooperative games de¯ned below.
We will test the coalitional rationality of market equilibria induced by a series of equitable' initial allocations of permits. Let e E T satisfying (10) be such an equitable allocation. If e E T is such that condition (12) is satis¯ed, then that equitable allocation leads to coalitional rationality at period T.
Otherwise, we choose another initial allocation which necessarily leads to coalitional rationality at period T . Such an allocation will be de¯ned in section 4.
For allocations of permits that guarantee that condition (12) is satis¯ed, it is thus rational for all countries, both individually and coalitionally, to sign the agreement in period T .
Coalitional rationality and rational expectations at preceding periods
The same reasoning is then applied in the preceding periods. At each such period, the countries face the same alternative of whether to sign or not the global agreement.
However, countries expectations on the future have to be taken into account now.
Following GTTZ (2003), we shall assume that countries have rational expectations in the sense that they anticipate the signing of global agreements in the future thanks to allocations of permits that lead to coalitional rationality.
Let e E t = ³ e E 1;t ; :::; e E n;t´b e an allocation of the permits satisfying condition (10) in period t, i.e. P i e E i;t = P i E ¤ i;t . The total costs for a country i at the competitive permits market equilibrium induced by the allocation e E t at period t is
with
where M t is the inherited stock at period t. This cost is composed of the current costs, including the costs of the net purchase of permits and of the future costs under global agreements in periods t + 1 to T , W i;t+1 . Again, because E CE i;t is a function of e E i;t , we may write W i;t ³ e E i;t´.
As before, the coalitional rationality of the competitive market equilibrium induced by the allocation e E t , is guaranteed only if
where V S;t is the total cost at time t for the members of S of the actions taken by them when S forms. The outcome of these actions is the Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium (PANE) with respect to S (see above) at time t.
The outcome of a PANE w.r.t. some S at time t (t 6 = T) reads as the outcome of a PANE w.r.t. some S at time T where subscripts T are replaced by subscripts t and where ®W i;t+1 is added to (14) and in the summation term of (13) in order to account for future (discounted) costs.
Exactly as in the last period, we will test at each period t the coalitional rationality of the market equilibrium induced by alternative`equitable' initial allocations of permits. If an equitable allocation e E t satisfying (10) does not lead to coalitional rationality at period t, we choose another initial allocation b E t = ³ b E 1;t ; :::; b E n;t´o btained as the solution of program (17) de¯ned below and which necessarily leads to coalitional rationality at period t. Therefore, all countries sign the global agreement in period t.
If we assume that this is perfectly anticipated in each of the preceding periods, we thus obtain, by backward induction, cooperation extending to all periods.
Cooperative games associated with the economic model
Implicit in the construction of the preceding paragraphs, which are in the spirit of GTTZ (2003) , is a sequence of cooperative games in characteristic function form [N; v t ( ¢ ; M t )] associated with the dynamic economic model at each period t. In each of these games, N = f1; :::; ng is the set of players and v t ( ¢ ; M t ) is the characteristic function of the game that associates to every coalition S µ N a real number called the worth of the coalition, given the stock M t prevailing at time t. In the present context, the worth of a coalition S is taken to be v t (S; M t )´V S;t (M t ), that is, as de¯ned by (13), the sum over all members of coalition S of the abatement and damage costs at the PANE w.r.t. S at time t.
For each such game, an imputation is an n-dimensional vector W t = [W 1t ; :::; W nt ] of which all components sum up to V N;t (M t ), and a°-core imputation is an imputation that satis¯es the coalitional rationality constraints, i.e., such that 
The sequence of such permits allocations yields a sequence of equilibria on the permits market, as well as corresponding trajectories of emissions, abatement costs and damage costs. As such trajectories are core-stable at each time t, that is, at each commitement period, the solution of the model over the entire time horizon describes a succession of core-stable global agreements.
Core-stable and equitable allocations
Equitable allocations of permits are not necessarily core-stable. When they are not, it is unlikely that they ever be implemented since some of the countries can do better by themselves. However, as shown in Chander, Tulkens, van Ypersele and Willems (2002) , allocations can be chosen so as to ensure core-stability. In this section, we present a method to modify equitable allocations in order to guarantee core-stability.
Before doing so, some common allocation rules are brie°y described. These are either directly based on equity principles or derived from well-known game-theoretic solution concepts.
Rules for the allocation

Rules based on equity principles
Various equity principles have been brought up in order to drive the discussions on how to share an amount of emission permits among nations, leading to the de¯nition of various allocation rules. Among these rules (see Rose et al. (1998) for a review of them),
we select those which are most often referred to, namely the egalitarian, grandfathering
and ability-to-pay (ATP) rules. Under the egalitarian rule, each country receives the same amount of permits per head. Under the grandfathering rule, the permits are allocated in proportion to CO 2 emissions in 1990. Finally, under the ability-to-pay rule, the amount of permits allocated to a country is inversely related to its GDP per capita. 5
Rules based on game-theoretic solution concepts
The issue of equity has received a lot of attention in the game theory literature.
Two game-theoretic solution concepts have been regarded as particularly attractive equitable solutions: (i) the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) and (ii) the Shapley value Shapley (1953) ). According to Maschler (1992, p. 634) , they are the most prominent game-theoretical solutions to revenue allocation problems. These concepts share the following desirable feature: they both lead to unique imputations. Moreover, the nucleolus always lies in the°-core {if it is not empty{ (see Schmeidler (1969) ), although this is not necessarily the case of the Shapley value.
The nucleolus and the Shapley value de¯ne imputations which for our games [N; v t ( ¢ ; M t )], t = 1; :::; T, we shall denote respectively NU t = (NU 1;t ; :::; NU i;t ; :::; NU n;t ) and SH t = (SH 1;t ; :::; SH i;t ; :::; SH n;t ). From any imputation ¹ W t we can infer the allocation of tradable permits ¹ E t = ¡ ¹ E 1;t ; :::; ¹ E n;t ¢ inducing a competitive market equilibrium which results in the same imputation by computing
5 Formally, country i receives at time t the following share of the total amount of permits:¸it =
¡® ) with ® < 1 and P OP denoting population.
In the simulations presented below in section 5, we arbitrarily set ® = 0:5.
where ¹ W i;t = NU i;t or ¹ W i;t = SH i;t .
Nucleolus
Consider e t (s; ¹ W t ) = P i2s ¹ W it ¡ V s;t as the excess of a coalition s at time t. By de¯nition, the nucleolus minimizes the greatest excess of any coalition. As suggested by Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1979) , if one considers the excess of a coalition as a measure of its dissatisfaction, the nucleolus solution minimizes the highest dissatisfaction, (which is equivalent to maximizing the lowest satisfaction). This increases stability, because the coalition with the highest dissatisfaction (or lowest satisfaction)
is likely to have the greatest incentives to defect. 6
The computation of the nucleolus is not an easy task and has given rise to many studies. Since, in our dynamic framework, the nucleolus solution must be computed more than 300 times 7 , we implement in the simulations the particularly fast algorithm developed by Potters, Reijnierse and Ansing (1996) . 8
Shapley value
The usual interpretation of the Shapley value (see Roth (1988) for an introduction to the Shapley value) consists in considering that the players arrive in a random order to form the grand coalition. If a player i forms a coalition with the set of players who arrived before him {call it coalition s{, then it adds V s[fig;t ¡ V s;t to the coalition s.
The probability that coalition s is present when i arrives is
. Hence, under the Shapley value a country is rewarded according to an average of its contribution to every possible coalition. 9 This value is easily computable.
6 See Maschler (1992) for a further discussion.
7 The solution must be computed P (T ¡ 1) + T times, where T = 31 is the number of periods and P = 10 is the number of regression points on which the value functions are estimated (see the algorithm in GTTZ (2003)). 8 They propose a prolonged simplex algorithm based on Mashler, Peleg and Shapley (1979) .
9 The Shapley value is often presented as the unique solution satisfying the four axioms of group rationality, symmetry, additivity and dummy player (see Shapley (1953) ).
A method to compute core-stable and equitable allocations
Among the various`equitable' allocation rules described above, only the one derived from the nucleolus solution concept is guaranteed to lead to an imputation belonging to the°-core (if it is not empty). Hence, since this will typically not be the case under the other allocation rules, we propose now a method which allows to compute allocations of permits leading to°-core imputations while taking as much as possible into account any initial allocation rule described above. 10
The aim of the method is to minimize the deviation from the initial equitable allocation in order to satisfy the°-core participation constraints. 
subject to the feasibility constraint
10 This method is an extension of the one proposed by Germain and van Steenberghe (2003) who deal with individual rationality but not with coalitional rationality. 11 For instance,¸it = P OP it P j2N P O Pj t under the egalitarian rule.
and the°-core constraints
where
and where ¾ CE t is the competitive market equilibrium price of the permits at time t.
By claim 2 and relation (18), the price at the competitive market equilibrium induced by the new allocation b E t is the same than the price at the equilibrium induced by the initial allocation e E t . This allows us to write relation (20).
Interpretation
The langrangian of problem (17) under the°-core constraints at period t is
where ' t is the multiplier associated to constraint (18) and ¼ St are the multipliers associated to constraints (19). The Kuhn-Tucker conditions of this problem are
First order condition (22) is the feasibility constraint (18). It ensures that, at each period, the same total amount of permits are allocated under both the initial and the new allocations.
Conditions (23) imply that any`constrained coalition' (that is, a coalition S for which ¼ St > 0) receives exactly the same total costs as under the PANE. Hence, the coalition is compensated in order to be induced to cooperate, but it does not receive more than what makes it indi®erent between signing or not the global agreement. Accordingly, as few permits as possible are devoted to the satisfaction of the constraints.
Conditions (21), which determine the new allocation of the permits, are however more di±cult to interpret. They can be written as
From these conditions, we derive¯ve properties. Consider two countries i 2 N and j 2 N . In order to save on notation, assume that only two non-empty coalitions,
The reasoning easily extends to more than two constrained coalitions (CC).
Proposition. Problem (17) leads to allocations of permits which satisfy the following properties:
(a) Two countries which do not belong to any CC receive the same proportional allocation, i.e. if i; j = 2 K and i; j = 2 L, then
(b) Countries belonging to the same CC receive the same proportional allocation, i.e. if i; j 2 K and/or i; j 2 L, then
(c) Countries belonging to di®erent CC receive di®erent proportional allocations,
(d) A country belonging to at least one CC receives proportionately more permits than a country not belonging to any CC, i.e. if i 2 K and/or i 2 L with j =
(e) A country belonging to the same CC as another country which also belongs to at least one more CC, receives a lower proportional allocation, i.e. if i = 2 K, j 2 K and i; j 2 L, then
Proof. By combining (21) and (22), it is easily shown that ' t¸0 . Moreover, by de¯nition,
; 8i 6 = j. Properties (a) to (e) derive then directly from (24).¥ Attractive illustrations of these properties are provided in appendix (see Section 8.4). Let us now turn to the simulation of the model and show how these properties apply to alternative constrained equitable allocations of tradable CO 2 permits.
Simulations
The data set is based on the RICE model (see Nordhaus and Yang (1996) 
The optimal path
Like in any other economic-climatic model, the optimal path is particularly sensitive to the following three elements. First, the levels of business-as-usual emissions in the far future are very uncertain. 13 Second, we know that the evaluation of damage costs is a particularly di±cult task, as well as a disputable issue. Consequently, the range for the evaluation of the damage costs induced by a given temperature change goes from 1
12 For comparison purposes, we use the same data and parameters as Germain and van Steenberghe (2003) . 13 In order to frame the debate on this issue, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
has de¯ned six families of economic scenarios leading alternative CO2 emissions levels (see IPCC (2000)). When compared to these scenarios, reference emissions in our data set (23.8 GtC in 2090-2100) fall below those of the A1FI scenario but¯t in these of the A2 one.
to 20. This is of crucial concern when an optimal path has to be computed. Third, the issue of discounting the far future is also very much debated. 14 In the absence of any consensus on the methodology to adopt and by simplicity, we use a constant discount rate that we set at a relatively low level, 1% per year, in order to still give some weight to the periods during which damages are likely to occur.
In fact, many global optimal emission paths may be justi¯ed. The one that is computed here is only one of them, from which we start analyzing the issue of°-core equitable allocations of emission permits.
Given our parametrization, world optimal emissions reach 14.6 GtC per year in 2090-2100, leading to a temperature change of 2. 14 See for instance the recent contributions by Weitzman (1998) and Newell and Pizer (2003) . Table 2 shows, for 4 selected periods, the permits per head allocated to each region and the total discounted gains due to cooperation for every coalition under both (i) the unconstrained egalitarian rule and (ii) the°-core constrained egalitarian rule. Total discounted gains due to cooperation of a coalition S are de¯ned as the di®erence between total discounted costs of S under the PANE w.r.t. S (V S;t ) and the sum of the members of S total discounted costs under the global agreement ( P i2S W i;t ). Under the°-core constrained allocations, total discounted costs under the global agreement are derived from the°-core constrained allocations ( b E t ) computed at each period via the resolution of problem (17). Under the label`unconstrained allocations', total costs under the global agreement are derived from allocations which are unconstrained in the period under investigation ( e E t ) but°-core constrained in the subsequent periods. 15
Core-stable egalitarian allocations
Moreover, a coalition S is said to be (°-core) constrained if its total discounted gains due to cooperation equal zero.
Unconstrained egalitarian allocations
In each period, the unconstrained egalitarian allocations lead, by de¯nition, to the same amount of permits per head in each region. We observe that two regions 15 Formally, under the unconstrained allocations, total gains of a coalition S at time t are given by
with Table 1 , their optimal level of emissions is relatively high due to a high level of GDP for USA and due to a low energy intensity for FSU. Accordingly, these regions {especially USA{ import a large amount of permits which leads to a substantial increase in their total costs.
16
Not surprisingly, coalition fUSA; F SUg (key 100010) bears very large costs due to cooperation. Many coalitions to which USA belongs also bear large costs due to cooperation. However, CHI (key 000100), ROW (key 000001) and coalition fCHI; ROW g (key 000101) enjoy huge bene¯ts due to cooperation.
The egalitarian allocation does not lead to coalitional rationality because some 16 The net imports of quotas are given by the di®erence between the optimal amount of emissions (E ¤ it ) and the allocation ( e Eit).
countries and group of countries do lose from global cooperation. Therefore, we constrain these allocations by using the method de¯ned above (section 4.2) in order tō nd, at each period, a new allocation which leads to°-core imputations and is as close as possible to the initial one.°-core constrained egalitarian allocations
The constrained allocations are very di®erent from the unconstrained ones, particularly for USA and FSU. In 2090-2100, these regions receive, respectively, almost 4 times and 2.5 times more permits than under the initial rule. For CHI and ROW, the new allocations are about 25% lower than the initial ones.
By de¯nition, no coalition bears costs due to cooperation anymore. The imputations belong to the°-core at each period. Moreover, the new allocations stand well on a face of the°-core, that is, . Indeed, fU SAg is constrained and the country receives permits accordingly. The compensation of fU SAg is however not su±cient to compensate coalition fUSA; F SU g. Hence, this coalition must receive even more permits. Since USA already receives more permits per head than FSU, the amount of permits needed to compensate the coalition is given to FSU rather than to USA. By this way, FSU receives enough permits in order to compensate fF SU g which had to bear costs due to cooperation under the unconstrained allocation.
Under the coalitionally constrained allocation, fF SU g even enjoys positive {although small{ gains due to cooperation while 
Core-stable and equitable allocations: a comparison
We analyze now the allocations of permits resulting from the use of each other equitable allocation rule mentioned above in section 4.1. As a starting point, we note that, like the egalitarian allocations (see above), the ability-to-pay and grandfathering ones need to be°-core constrained while the Shapley value based and the nucleolus based allocations lead to°-core imputations. A comparison of these allocations follows their brief description. Table 3 shows the annual amount of permits allocated per capita under each rule at the end of this century (2090-2100). The corresponding individual total discounted gains are also depicted.
17
The ability-to-pay rule (A.T.P.) is de¯ned in such a way that countries with low per capita GDP are favored. As a result, a country like CHI receives large gains due to cooperation. All the other regions are constrained, either individually or within a coalition. Indeed, gains of coalitions fUSAg, fUSA; F SU g, fUSA; J PN; FSU g, fU SA; JP N; EU; FSUg and fUSA; J PN; EU; FSU; ROW g equal zero (not shown in Table 3 ). This situation is therefore very similar to the one implied by the use of the (°-core constrained) egalitarian rule, except that ROW receives much more permits, to the detriment of JPN and EU. Permits per head (1 quota = 1 ton of carbon) in 2090-2100 Table 3 .°-core constrained allocations in 2090-2100 -Various rules
The grandfathering rule (Grandf.) draws a very di®erent picture since constrained coalitions include fROWg and fCHI; ROWg. These regions receive much fewer permits than under the two other rules. Indeed, compared to the other regions, they are penalized by their lower level of historical emissions while their reference emissions are growing at a higher rate.
Before turning to the analysis of the rules based on the two game-theoretic solution concepts, we make a comparison with the results of Germain and van Steenberghe (2003) who perform the same kind of analysis but limit the participation constraint to individual rationality. Does the introduction of°-core (coalitional rationality) constraints, instead of individual rationality constraints, change signi¯cantly the results ?
The answer depends on the rule under consideration. For instance, the amount of permits allocated to each region under the egalitarian rule are almost the same under °-core constraints than under individual rationality constraints. However, a signi¯cant di®erence is observed under the ability-to-pay rule (up to 28% for CHI in 2090-2100), as well as under the grandfathering one. Hence, the extension of the participation constraints from individual to coalitional (°-core) rationality may signi¯cantly narrow the set of allocations leading to a global agreement.
The nucleolus based allocations lead to a high level of stability because the gain of the coalition with lowest gain is maximized. Since total gains are strictly positive, every coalition necessarily receives a positive gain and, consequently, the imputation necessarily belongs to the°-core (since the°-core exists at all periods). In the present The Shapley value based allocations are such that countries are rewarded according to their average contribution to every possible coalition. In the present context, since the contribution of a country to a coalition is a priori an increase in costs, countries receive larger gains (and more permits) when they increase by a little amount the costs of the other members of the coalition that it joins. This increase may take place through two channels. First, each coalition adopts an optimal policy for its members.
The optimal policy of the new coalition therefore changes. The change will depend on the level of the marginal abatement costs and marginal damage costs of the newcoming country relative to those of the other countries in the coalition. The relatively large gains enjoyed by CHI and ROW suggest that countries with low marginal abatement and damage costs tend to receive a large part of the gains. Second, the size of the countries, in terms of absolute abatement and damage costs, also matter since the costs are expressed in absolute value. This explains the large gains enjoyed by a country like USA.
A comparison of the amount of permits allocated and the gains obtained under the two game-theoretic rules shows that they are not very di®erent form each other. In 2090-2100, the largest di®erence in the allocation of permits is observed for JPN, with 13% more permits under the nucleolus based allocation than under the Shapley based one.
A similar comparison among all rules shows that the allocations based on equity principles allow for a relatively large°exibility in the selection of allocations leading to°-core imputations. For instance, USA receives 23% more permits under the grandfathering rule than under the egalitarian or the ability-to-pay one. This ratio increases up to 193% for JPN when the grandfathering rule is compared to the ability-to-pay one ( 83% for EU, -13% for CHI, 21% for FSU and -6% for ROW).
Moreover, the nucleolus based permits allocations (and thus also the gains), leading to imputations lying`in the middle' of the°-core, are between those resulting from the use of the egalitarian and the ability-to-pay rules. Indeed, the°-core constrained allocations based on equity principles lead to imputations which are necessarily on the faces of the°-core and the rules based on the equity principles that are considered here lead to imputations located on di®erent faces of the°-core.
Conclusion
Most so-called`equitable' rules to allocate greenhouse gas emission permits among countries under a global agreement are likely not to be accepted by some nation or group of nations because they run too strongly against their self interest. Consequently, we have developed a way to compute allocations of permits which satisfy a participation constraint while keeping as much as possible any`equitable' allocation rule into account. The members of any coalition of countries for which an`equitable' allocation is not acceptable (their participation constraint is violated) receive more permits in order to compensate the coalition so as to make it indi®erent for them to sign or not to sign the global agreement. Countries belonging to unconstrained coalitions (coalitions whose participation constraint is not violated) receive then fewer permits than the others. Since any given country may belong at the same time to a constrained coalition and to an unconstrained one, the way to modify the gains of such a country is not straightforward: this modi¯cation a®ects the gains {and therefore the incentives to participate in the agreement{ of both coalitions. Our method deals with that problem. Moreover, the rule based on an equity principle is preserved as much as possible among the members of both constrained and unconstrained coalitions.
Simulations with the main permits allocation rules based on equity principles as well as on game-theoretic solution concepts, the nucleolus and the Shapley value, have been performed. These simulations highlight two results of particular interest. First, introducing°-core constraints instead of individual rationality constraints only may signi¯cantly a®ect the amount of permits to be allocated under a constrained allocation rule. However, the magnitude of this e®ect di®ers very much from rule to rule.
Second, the degree of freedom for allocating emission permits while satisfying at each period°-core participation constraints is still signi¯cantly large. For instance, under a global agreement, the United States of America receive 23% more permits with the constrained grandfathering rule than with the ability-to-pay one at the end of this century. This¯gure goes up to 193% for Japan, 83% for the European Union, 21% for former Soviet Union and -13% for China.
The simplicity of the model used here is justi¯ed by the simultaneous introduction of three important features: (i) an international market for emission permits, (ii) core constraints and especially (iii) a dynamic negotiations framework. However, the usual shortcomings of economic-climatic models are present. Of particular concern is the evaluation of the damages caused in the di®erent regions by a change in the atmospheric temperature and of the costs of these damages. This is certainly a crucial issue on which further research is needed. Let e E t = n e E 1;t ; :::; e E n;t o be a vector of tradable permits satisfying (10), i.e. P i e E i;t = P i E ¤ i;t , where E ¤ i;t is the optimal level of emissions for country i at period t and is given by (6) (section 3.2). Recall that E ¤ i;t satis¯es (9), that is
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where ¢ t = ®¯P n j=1
Under competitive market conditions, given the allocation e E t , each country minimizes its abatement costs and chooses its levels of emissions E it and net sales of permits
where ¾ t is the competitive market price of the permits. The FOC for an interior solution is
which, since C 0 i;t is strictly increasing, leads to a level of emissions
The aggregate excess demand for permits is thus
. The equilibrium market clearing price, ¾ CE t , satis¯es thus
By P i e E i;t = P i E ¤ i;t , we have
i;t (¡¢ t ). Therefore, taking into account that C 0 ¡1 i;t is strictly increasing 8i,
and thus
By (28) 
. Let ª t be the set of imputations at period t, i.e. ª t = fx 2 R n j P n i=1 x i = V s;t ; s = Ng. Then, the nucleolus in period t, NU t , is dened as follows:
Shapley value -The Shapley value is easier to de¯ne. The total costs (imputation) of a country i at time t are given by: Output and emissions growth rates are taken from a model developed at CORE by Germain, Tulkens, Tulkens and van Ypersele (2002) and which is based on the RICE'98 model (Nordhaus and Boyer, 1999) . Population, output, energy intensity and parameters characterizing damage and abatement cost functions (4) and (5) For the purpose of illustration, let us assume that there are only three countries named A, B and C. 20 The set of coalitions that we consider is therefore ffAg ; fBg ; fCg ;
fA; Bg ; fA; Cg; fB; Cg; fA; B; Cgg, fA; B; Cg being the grand coalition.
Note that if no coalition is constrained, it is straightforward to show that the new allocation is the same as the initial one, i.e. b E it = e E it , i = A; B; C. Consider the four following examples.
EXAMPLE I. (Only one singleton complains)
If only coalition fAg is constrained under the initial allocation, i.e. W At > V fAgt , W Bt < V fBgt and W Ct < V fCgt , then problem (17) subject to (18)- (20) leads to
At (see properties (a) and (d)). This shows that the compensating regions, namely regions B and C, receive fewer permits than under the 20 As mentionned in Section 4.2, the method applies to any number of countries.
initial rule because they must compensate region A in order to induce it to cooperate. Furthermore, the allocation rule is preserved among these compensating regions.
An illustration of this example {which will prove to be very useful for the discussion of the other, more complex, examples{ is provided in¯gures 1a and 1b. The¯gures represent the hyperplane corresponding to the set of total discounted gains due to cooperation,
, for any allocation of permits satisfying
Hence, it is the set of imputations which is rescaled so as to represent the individual gains due to cooperation.
Accordingly, the empty triangle is formed by the three individual rationality (IR) constraints: any point on the AB line corresponds to no gains for country C ( ¹ W Ct = V fCgt ) and similarly for lines AC (no gains for B) and BC (no gains for A). ). Any point on this arrow and to the left (respectively, to the right) of O corresponds to an allocation of permits such that, compared to the initial allocation, country A receives more (fewer) permits:
). Similarly, the points on the top-down arrow correspond to allocations of permits such that
, and those on the bottom-right to top-left arrow correspond to allocations such that
Bt . Figure 1 .a illustrates the situation in which¸A t =¸B t =¸C t . The dotted lines are then orthogonal to the IR constraints and the objective function is a sphere (a circle on the plane). However, in the more general case of¸A t 6 =¸B t 6 =¸C t , the dotted lines are not orthogonal to the IR constraints anymore and the objective function becomes an ellipsoid. This is illustrated in¯gure 1.b. Note that it can then be proven that the objective function is tangent to each IR constraint at the intersection of the IR constraint and the corresponding dotted arrow, e.g. the objective function is tangent to BC at point E.
Now, point E corresponds to the constrained allocation of permits as provided by the resolution of problem (17). In¯gures 1.a and 1.b, only country A needs to be compensated and countries B and C participate to this compensation in such a way that the initial allocation rule is kept among them, i.e. E is on the left-right dotted arrow.
EXAMPLE II. (One coalition complains)
If only coalition fA; Bg is constrained under the initial allocation, i.e. W At +W Bt > V fA;Bgt and P i2S W it < V St 8S 6 = fA; Bg, then problem (17) subject to (18) This example is illustrated in¯gure 2.a. The new horizontal line depicts the di®er-ence between (i) the sum of the total costs for A and B at the Nash equilibrium (any PANE w.r.t. a singleton) (e.g. P S2ffAg;fBgg;t V S;t ) and (ii) the total costs for coalition fA; Bg at the PANE w.r.t. fA; Bg (V fA;Bg;t ). Consequently, the set of coalitionally rational gains due to cooperation for each region lie therefore in the empty trapeze.
Since the objective function is tangent to the horizontal line along the OE arrow, point E is the solution of problem (17) At . Let's illustrate the reasoning. Country C has to receive necessarily fewer permits than under the initial allocation in order to compensate fAg and fA; Bg. Indeed, the payo® (gains due to cooperation) of fAg has to be increased so as to give it an appropriate amount of permits . By the same token, the payo® of fA; Bg has also been increased since A belongs to that coalition. Then, two situations emerge. 
